Assessing Moral Relativism
I want to form a critique of various forms of moral relativism, particularly cultural moral relativism. This is not a disproof of moral relativism, but rather, as stated, a critique--displaying the absurdity that is [cultural] moral relativism.
I want here to create a new term--or, if not new, a term I've yet to encounter outside this short essay: familial moral relativism. A family can be compared to a culture; and is, in a sense, a miniature culture of its own. Even within the same culture, every family is different. Each family has its own methods of communication and interaction. Each one has its own ideas, values, rules, rewards and punishments, and miniature social ladders. All of the building blocks for a culture exist within the family: the family is the base unit for the culture.
"Different rules for different families." This quote, or some variation thereof, would be the motto of the familial moral relativist. It implies not just different rules, but different moral values as well--different standards of "right" and "wrong." While if not taken absolutely, this is (or can be argued to be) true to a certain extent, the familial moral relativist states that absolutely no standards of right and wrong exist from family to family--but only within families. That is, what is wrong for one family is not wrong for another, and a member of one family should never judge the values and actions within another family. E.g., if a child in one family is alloted a $10 weekly allowance while a child in another family is allotted $5, we are not to judge this apparent discrepancy--different families, different rules. An easy enough concept to accept on the face of it. And, where in one family a child is rewarded for good grades, and in another family a child is beaten and half-starved as punishment for poor academic performance--this, too, we should not judge. Different rules for different families.
At this point a sensible person might become disgusted at the idea of familial moral relativism. After all, how could one possibly morally accept the family with the drunken father who beats his wife and children? If we don't accept that different families can hold to drastically different "moral values," why do some of us accept this of different cultures?
I should note here that I am not advocating (within this essay) any sort of alternative moral theory (absolute or otherwise). I am not suggesting or implying that one set of standards apply to all. If I may give an example without diverging too far from the primary subject, I would not judge the discrepancy of two families who give their respective children different amounts for their weekly allowances as per the earlier example; this does not, however, make me a familial moral relativist, regardless of the fact that the familial moral relativist and I agree on that point. In short, moral absolutism is not the only alternative to moral relativism, and this essay should not be seen as promoting any kind of absolutist (or other) moral theory--it exists only as a critique of moral relativism.
It may be a concern of some that I have made too simple a comparison between familial moral relativism and cultural moral relativism, without addressing the issues that differentiate the two and might make cultural moral relativism "more valid" than its new familial cousin. But the truth is that these differences don't exist, though they may have the illusion of existing without closer inspection.
It could be said that cultures persist in their existence for a reason--that the moral values they've created (or that have emerged) have enabled the survival of the cultures and are thus morally acceptable. Immoral values would have been abandoned in favor of more beneficial values that would better aid the culture. It is arguable whether the survivability of moral values within a culture actually validates them. As it is not relevant to this essay I will not address that specific issue, but instead concentrate upon the illogic of such "validation" and how this does not differentiate families and cultures.
When logically followed through, cultural moral relativism is anti-progressive and adherents to the moral theory, were they to follow through with their logic, would has us go back to primal societies (at best). If everything within a culture (with regard to moral values) is already morally correct, there is no need for progression or change. But the truth is that moral values in cultures do progress and change. When a culture abandons an archaic moral value in favor of a new one, the cultural moral relativist is left with a paradox: if he accepts that both values (both the abandoned and the new) are valid, he accepts a contradiction that makes his theory fallacious. If instead he accepts one or the other value as valid, but not both, he denies his own moral theory in his very attempt to accept it. Finally, if he states that the old value was once valid until replaced by the new value which is now valid, then he accepts moral nihilism rather than moral relativism.
In order for the cultural moral relativist to be correct, cultures would have to remain unchanged. Movements like the Women's Suffrage or the Civil Rights Movement would have been immoral because the status quo of the time was already morally acceptable.
The cultural moral relativist might argue that cultural moral values are correct (where familial values might not be) because of their survivability. But cultures do change and progress. Values within cultures are still changing. The same standard is not being applied to both varieties of moral relativism: cultural moral values are allowed to change and progress where familial moral values must be aligned with its culture's values.
Also, the cultural moral relativist does not realize that families have the same sorts of histories that cultures do. A home that consists of a mother, father, and two children did not suddenly appear out of an empty vortex and begin anew with moral values from scratch (or borrowed from its culture). No, the members of that family belong to a larger family outside of the home. Traditions and moral values, as well as family history, has been passed down from the parents of the parents, and from their parents, and so on. The family here has actually survived and changed, just like any culture has--it has persisted in its existence in the exact same manner, and therefore you cannot differentiate the two in this manner.
Any other attempt to differentiate families and cultures is completely arbitrary. In this manner the cultural moral relativist must instead adopt familial moral relativism (or accept fallacious logic). Hen then must morally accept the families in his own culture where members of that family might be treated poorly (beaten, starved, etc) because the moral values of those families permit such activity.
I want here to create a new term--or, if not new, a term I've yet to encounter outside this short essay: familial moral relativism. A family can be compared to a culture; and is, in a sense, a miniature culture of its own. Even within the same culture, every family is different. Each family has its own methods of communication and interaction. Each one has its own ideas, values, rules, rewards and punishments, and miniature social ladders. All of the building blocks for a culture exist within the family: the family is the base unit for the culture.
"Different rules for different families." This quote, or some variation thereof, would be the motto of the familial moral relativist. It implies not just different rules, but different moral values as well--different standards of "right" and "wrong." While if not taken absolutely, this is (or can be argued to be) true to a certain extent, the familial moral relativist states that absolutely no standards of right and wrong exist from family to family--but only within families. That is, what is wrong for one family is not wrong for another, and a member of one family should never judge the values and actions within another family. E.g., if a child in one family is alloted a $10 weekly allowance while a child in another family is allotted $5, we are not to judge this apparent discrepancy--different families, different rules. An easy enough concept to accept on the face of it. And, where in one family a child is rewarded for good grades, and in another family a child is beaten and half-starved as punishment for poor academic performance--this, too, we should not judge. Different rules for different families.
At this point a sensible person might become disgusted at the idea of familial moral relativism. After all, how could one possibly morally accept the family with the drunken father who beats his wife and children? If we don't accept that different families can hold to drastically different "moral values," why do some of us accept this of different cultures?
I should note here that I am not advocating (within this essay) any sort of alternative moral theory (absolute or otherwise). I am not suggesting or implying that one set of standards apply to all. If I may give an example without diverging too far from the primary subject, I would not judge the discrepancy of two families who give their respective children different amounts for their weekly allowances as per the earlier example; this does not, however, make me a familial moral relativist, regardless of the fact that the familial moral relativist and I agree on that point. In short, moral absolutism is not the only alternative to moral relativism, and this essay should not be seen as promoting any kind of absolutist (or other) moral theory--it exists only as a critique of moral relativism.
It may be a concern of some that I have made too simple a comparison between familial moral relativism and cultural moral relativism, without addressing the issues that differentiate the two and might make cultural moral relativism "more valid" than its new familial cousin. But the truth is that these differences don't exist, though they may have the illusion of existing without closer inspection.
It could be said that cultures persist in their existence for a reason--that the moral values they've created (or that have emerged) have enabled the survival of the cultures and are thus morally acceptable. Immoral values would have been abandoned in favor of more beneficial values that would better aid the culture. It is arguable whether the survivability of moral values within a culture actually validates them. As it is not relevant to this essay I will not address that specific issue, but instead concentrate upon the illogic of such "validation" and how this does not differentiate families and cultures.
When logically followed through, cultural moral relativism is anti-progressive and adherents to the moral theory, were they to follow through with their logic, would has us go back to primal societies (at best). If everything within a culture (with regard to moral values) is already morally correct, there is no need for progression or change. But the truth is that moral values in cultures do progress and change. When a culture abandons an archaic moral value in favor of a new one, the cultural moral relativist is left with a paradox: if he accepts that both values (both the abandoned and the new) are valid, he accepts a contradiction that makes his theory fallacious. If instead he accepts one or the other value as valid, but not both, he denies his own moral theory in his very attempt to accept it. Finally, if he states that the old value was once valid until replaced by the new value which is now valid, then he accepts moral nihilism rather than moral relativism.
In order for the cultural moral relativist to be correct, cultures would have to remain unchanged. Movements like the Women's Suffrage or the Civil Rights Movement would have been immoral because the status quo of the time was already morally acceptable.
The cultural moral relativist might argue that cultural moral values are correct (where familial values might not be) because of their survivability. But cultures do change and progress. Values within cultures are still changing. The same standard is not being applied to both varieties of moral relativism: cultural moral values are allowed to change and progress where familial moral values must be aligned with its culture's values.
Also, the cultural moral relativist does not realize that families have the same sorts of histories that cultures do. A home that consists of a mother, father, and two children did not suddenly appear out of an empty vortex and begin anew with moral values from scratch (or borrowed from its culture). No, the members of that family belong to a larger family outside of the home. Traditions and moral values, as well as family history, has been passed down from the parents of the parents, and from their parents, and so on. The family here has actually survived and changed, just like any culture has--it has persisted in its existence in the exact same manner, and therefore you cannot differentiate the two in this manner.
Any other attempt to differentiate families and cultures is completely arbitrary. In this manner the cultural moral relativist must instead adopt familial moral relativism (or accept fallacious logic). Hen then must morally accept the families in his own culture where members of that family might be treated poorly (beaten, starved, etc) because the moral values of those families permit such activity.
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Labels: culture, ethics, moral relativism, morality, philosophy
posted by squarecircle at
1:06 PM
3 Comments:
Your an ass hole.
figures its a 24 year old. Laugh, and stop pretending to be something your not.
24 year old ass hole.
I thought the piece was well written, well researched, and well thought. I find immature comments like those made by "anonymous" to be a sign of neanderthal reasoning and pure ignorance.
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